Ankara Train Collision: Train Line Opened Despite Incompleteness

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The legal expert report on the train crash in the capital Ankara on December 13 where nine people lost their lives has been completed.

The three-people delegation of experts from Eskişehir Technical University Rail Systems Program sent the 12-page report to the prosecutor's office which is running the investigation.

The report cited three main reasons for the crash:

*The line was opened despite incompleteness

*Wrong traffic management system

*Changing maneuvers

Although the train that crashed was a High Speed Train (YHT), the report said that it is not true to name the incident as a "high-speed train crash" as the train was on a conventional line and had a speed of 110 km/h when it crashed head to head with a guiding locomotive.

The three root reasons

Opening of the line despite incompleteness

Noting that the traffic control system that was planned to be used in the Ankara-Sincan line was the European Railways Traffic Management System - European Train Control System (ERTMS-ETCS), the report said that the line was opened before the high-speed railroad was completed and the requirements of the ERTMS-ETCS were met.

İsa Apaydın, the then-general manager of the The State Railways of the Republic of Turkey (TCDD), is culpable for the incident, the report said. Apaydın was discharged from his post in February.

Wrong traffic management system

Because it was not possible to use the ERTMS-ETCS due to too early opening, the TCDD established a new traffic control system that does not exist in the "international regulations and international railroad network," according to the report.

"This system is not a system that was practiced before. Its possible risks are unknown and it has no place in the literature," the report said.

The system was established upon an order signed by TCDD Vice General Manager A.İ.U and TCDD General Management Department Chair M.A., both of whom are culpable, the report concluded.

It also said, "Establishing a new traffic management system is a great risk regarding security. For this reason A.İ.U., M.A. and Traffic and Station Department Branch Chair R.K. are culpable."

"The necessary risk analysis regarding the opening of the line was not conducted. If a risk analysis about the opening of the line without the ETCS-ERTMS was conducted, probably a decision would be made for not opening the line," the report noted.

Changing maneuvers

The report said that upon an order dated December 6, 2018, the trains would be arranged from the Ankara western section rather than the eastern section. The crash happened four days after this change.

"When the High Speed Train maneuvers were made in the eastern section, an accident would happen because of faults by at least three or four people who are directly involved. When the maneuvers began to be made in the west, this number dropped to one or two," the report said.

"Changing maneuvers from east to west is the third root cause of the accident. Those who are responsible for this decision, TCDD Deputy General Manager İ.Ç., 8th Regional Manager D.Y., 8th Region Service Manager Ü.S., 8th Region Deputy Service Manager V.E.T. are culpable," the report concluded.

How did the crash happen?

The report also reached the following conclusions:

*Train organization officer (switchman) O.Y. is culpable for directing the train to line 2 rather than line 1.

*It has been understood from the camera footage that O.Y. looks at the switch from a distance and returns after thinking it is on the correct line.

*Train driver Adem Yaşar who was killed in the accident caused the accident by not realizing the train was on line 2 when it should be on line 1.

*Ankara Railroad Terminal Manager T.Ü. and Deputy Manager K.O. are culpable for making switchman O.Y. start to work without training him. (EKN/VK)