The new resolution process that began in October 2024 is about to complete its ninth month. During this short but intense period, we have witnessed numerous developments; we have tried to understand and interpret the process through analyses, comments, and discussions. Although our positions have become somewhat clearer, efforts to understand and define the process itself remain important. The uncertainties about what it is, what it is not, and where it is going have not been resolved.
This nine-month picture makes it possible to define this process as a “postmodern peace.” Let us explain why...
Postmodernism and peace
The concept of “postmodernism” is one that was frequently referenced in the social sciences for a time, but has since lost its luster, though it is worth revisiting. This concept, which gained popularity in the late 1970s with the work of French sociologist Jean-François Lyotard on the information society, began to be used worldwide in the 1980s and in Turkey in the mid-1990s, expressing a rebellion against the epistemological, cultural, and political hegemony of modernity. Perspectives such as questioning the "grand narratives" such as industrialization, enlightenment, rationalism, positivism, and progress; the end of grand narratives; criticism of universalism; the plurality of truths; ambiguity; unpredictability; flexibility; the end of certainties; openness; the erosion of impossibilities; and the coexistence of the old and the new formed the basis of fundamental debates within the postmodern approach in politics, art, architecture, literature, and the social sciences.
The new resolution process, like this conceptual framework, shows that we are facing an unpredictable, complex, uncertain, fragile, singular, flexible, and multi-layered peace and resolution process. We are witnessing a resolution process that is much more uncertain, much more flexible, much more “formless,” ruleless, and insecure, outside the realm of modern peace theory and imagination.
Over the past ten months, it has not been possible to give this process a name. Official authorities have preferred to refer to it as “terror-free Turkey” while the Kurdish side has preferred to call it “Peace and Democratic Society.” In some public debates, it has also been attempted to define it with terms such as “peace without democracy” and “authoritarian peace.” Precisely because it expresses this uncertainty and difficulty in defining it, the term “postmodern peace” has the potential to accurately capture the spirit and content of the process.
Uncertainty: The nature of the process?
From the outset, the new process has been shrouded in uncertainty and unpredictability. While some say that this process has a high chance of success, neither its beginning, nor its purpose, nor its future is clear. Not only can no one say exactly why this process began, but it is also full of question marks as to how it will work, where it will lead, and whether it will resolve the Kurdish issue. Whether it will bring about democratization is another mystery.
This state of uncertainty stems not only from legal and structural factors, but also from the actors involved. The actors' intentions are unclear; the process is not transparent; and regional developments are as uncertain and complex as the peace process in Turkey. When all these factors come together, what we are left with is a picture of “postmodern peace” whose direction, principles, and boundaries are unclear.
The absence of a grand narrative
Many of the modern approaches to peace and resolution presented society with a grand narrative. (Kant) An eternal and sacred narrative of peace: “The guns will fall silent, everything will be wonderful, peoples will become brothers, rights will be recognized and guaranteed, the past will be confronted, and a new democratic society will be built...” In short, there will be a transition from the “state of nature” (state of war), much discussed by early modern philosophers (Hobbes, Locke, etc.), to the “civil society” (state of peace), a system governed by democratic rules and institutions. However, there is no such narrative of peace in the current resolution process. There is no real confrontation between peoples, no promise of lasting peace, no common vision of democratization, no institutions or norms... On the contrary, society cannot yet predict what it will gain at the end of this process or what kind of peace it will be. It is managing by saying that even the worst peace is better than war.
The absence of a grand narrative also makes it difficult for those directly affected by the process to emotionally or politically commit to peace. That is because there is no story to convince, heal, or transform them. Looking at this picture, people ask, “Then why did we have to endure so many years of suffering?”
There are, of course, some “medium-sized” narratives that attempt to explain the process: for example, the thesis that there is a “state policy” necessitated by developments in the Middle East... Or justifications related to Turkey's regional calculations. However, these are neither strong enough nor capable of creating a collective belief. Therefore, they do not function as a convincing “grand narrative.” The claim that the PKK has completed its historical task and mission and has begun to repeat itself also fits into this category. Although it is a fact that weapons and violence are truly ineffective tools in resolving the Kurdish issue, there are no adequate answers to the questions of why this tool was taken out of circulation so late and why it is happening now.
Statements that the process is aimed at reestablishing “historical Turkish-Kurdish” brotherhood or “unity of the ummah” and alliance also fail to serve as a “grand narrative.” This is because this narrative does not provide any foresight as to how a past that took place a thousand years ago can be a reference point for saving the present and the future. Moreover, since the concrete expectations and sensitivities of the Kurdish people, which go beyond brotherhood, are not emphasized as they should be in this narrative, it leads to the formation of a hierarchy among sensitivities and loses its impact.
Lawlessness: Personal will, institutional absence
Modern peace theories and processes are based on certain principles and institutional mechanisms. Common sense, principles, mediators, protocols, guarantor states or international institutions, legal and judicial guarantees, power and authority sharing, etc. When we look at this process, we see that there are almost no norms, rules, or mechanisms. The commission expected to be established in the Grand National Assembly of Turkey is not one of the mechanisms I mentioned. I am referring to the existence of functional institutional mechanisms that will make peace permanent and prevent conflicts from reigniting. For example, German peace researcher Dieter Senghaas calls these mechanisms the “civilization hexagon.” Therefore, this process is being driven by the personal attitudes and desires of politicians and negotiators; institutional structures and laws either do not exist, are merely for show, or will exist in the potential near future.
The process is not being driven by a legal or political framework, but rather by the will of leaders, based on the gestures, silences, and occasional statements of the actors involved. As a result, there is a constant sense of unease that everything could start over or end at any moment. Opposition parties can be considered participants in the process one day and declared “culprits” the next. Rules are applied arbitrarily and only to the extent that they are convenient, and are set aside when necessary.
Flexibility: 'Everything solid melts into air'
Flexibility, the hallmark of postmodernism, is the most visible characteristic of this process. Whatever was once deemed “impossible” has now become “Wow, is that even possible?” Discourses have shifted, positions have been redefined, and taboos have been broken. Friends and enemies have swapped places, been redefined, or are being portrayed as such.
Two subjects stand out in this regard: Devlet Bahçeli and Abdullah Öcalan. Bahçeli, who once called Öcalan the “separatist ringleader,” now refers to him as “the key to the solution”; he refers to Öcalan as the “founding leader” of the PKK and even talks about his release. Öcalan, on the other hand, is now bringing the laying down of arms, which he previously called “the last step,” to the forefront of the process. He hardly mentions concepts such as autonomy and federation. Everything that was rigid in the third official attempt at a solution and negotiation of the Kurdish question is evaporating, and in this sense, we are witnessing a “postmodern peace” process.
Rational choice: The subjects are doing the math
One of the aspects that makes the new solution process postmodern is that the actors are not acting based on modern-era understandings of peace, i.e., principled, idealistic, and moral motives, but rather based on cost-benefit calculations. Erdoğan, Bahçeli, and Öcalan... Even if they do not agree on a common principle of peace, each of them continues to be a subject of this process in line with their defined political interests and gives direction and shape to the process through these cost calculations.
For example, Öcalan is no longer just a popular leader; he is also a rational political actor who devises strategies and tactics, repositioning himself for the first time in twenty-six years and re-entering the politics of Turkey. When we ask what this rational pragmatism has cost or gained Kurdish politics over the past ten months, it is not difficult to say that the gains have been abundant and the losses almost nonexistent. However, this rationalism does not yet tell us whether the Kurdish question will truly be resolved. Because in this rationalism, the question of how the Kurdish people will obtain the rights, justice, and freedom that arise from their collective existence is perhaps waiting in parentheses, spread out over a long period of social time.
As a result, the new resolution process bears no resemblance to the peace and resolution processes of modern times. This process is characterized by uncertainty and irregularities, does not promise great peace, and is shaped by the flexibility and rational pragmatism of the actors involved. In these respects, it is a truly postmodern attempt at peace. And like postmodernism itself, it is neither entirely hopeful nor entirely hopeless... But one thing is certain: this process offers a hybrid, ambiguous, and contradictory experience of peace. (ÇG/AEK/VK)
