When we look at the media landscape in Turkey, we see a structure shaped around two main poles. On one side are media outlets that maintain and reproduce pro-government discourse, and on the other are platforms that try to engage in critical journalism against the government. At the same time, the struggle for survival continues for media organizations that try to remain independent of all political and economic power centers. This picture provides a significant basis for us to revisit the issue of media ownership and media pluralism with the new year.
The seizure by the Savings Deposit Insurance Fund (TMSF) in Sep 2025 of companies including Show TV and Habertürk (according to 2024 data, a total of 151 press outlets have been seized), the appointment of a trustee to Tele 1 in Oct 2025, and the emergence and swift closure of new media ventures by new businesspeople entering the media sector in recent years—as in the example of Ekol TV—all show that we need to reconsider the changes in media ownership.
In this interview, we look at developments in media ownership in Turkey since 2021 together with Prof. Dr. Bilge Yeşil, author of Media in New Turkey: The Origins of an Authoritarian Neoliberal State, who analyzes the structure of media ownership in Turkey in relation to political power and neoliberal transformation. Yeşil is a professor of Media Culture at CUNY College of Staten Island and a faculty member in the Middle Eastern Studies Program at the CUNY Graduate Center. We discuss what has changed, what has remained the same, and how we should interpret this picture over the past four years.
Bilge Yeşil’s latest book, Talking Back to the West: How Turkey Uses Counter-Hegemony to Reshape the Global Communication Order (2024), was shaped as a comprehensive study analyzing Turkey's global communication strategy, particularly the discourse and media initiatives developed by the Justice and Development Party (AKP) government against the West.
Media ownership in Turkey over the past four years
With the Media Ownership Monitor (MOM) Turkey Project, we published the last comprehensive update on media ownership in Turkey in 2021. Then, in the webinar we held with you in Dec 2021, we discussed how deeply intertwined media ownership in Turkey is with political and economic relations, and what this structure means in terms of press freedom. Looking back from today, shall we start by summarizing what has changed in the structure of media ownership in Turkey over the past four years (2021–2025)? Are we talking about familiar developments carried over from the past and not very surprising, or new ruptures?
There have been no major changes in the structure of media ownership—except, of course, for what happened to Habertürk, Show TV, and Tele1. The dominance of capital groups with ties to the government in the media sector has continued. As in the past, the media continues to function not so much as an investment area in itself, but rather as a tool for political influence and alignment with power. Of course, a few organizations that are not pro-government and have managed to survive stand apart from this picture. Although there was no direct rupture, certain dynamics deepened during this period: self-censorship and content standardization were at the forefront.
This process clearly shows how destructive an impact ownership alone can have, even without structural changes. The regime of pressure established through the Radio and Television Supreme Council (RTÜK) and the Press Advertising Agency (BİK) has deepened further. Broadcast suspensions, advertising bans, and heavy fines have turned into a direct matter of survival for media owners who are not aligned with the government.
As for developments in digitalization and platformization: while the structure of newspaper and television ownership has largely remained the same, digital platforms and YouTube-centered news production have created new actors. However, increasingly punitive measures have begun to be imposed in this area as well. In short, there has been no fundamental transformation in media ownership between 2021 and 2025, but the existing structure has become more politicized and more closed.
Media Ownership Monitor (MOM) Turkey
The seizure of approximately 120 companies in Sep 2025, including Habertürk and Show TV, the appointment of a trustee to Tele 1 in Oct, and the transfer of these assets to the TMSF marked a striking development in terms of media–capital–state relations. These mass seizures and the trustee/TMSF mechanisms are once again on the agenda. How should we interpret this process in the context of the economic disciplining of the media, the reestablishment of political control, or the redistribution of capital?
In fact, the seizure of media outlets and their transfer to TMSF ownership is not a surprising development. As will be recalled, following the 2001 economic crisis, holdings that went bankrupt and their affiliated newspaper, television, and radio outlets were transferred to the TMSF to be sold off to cover their debts. Similarly, after July 15, many newspapers, radio, and TV outlets were seized, and the assets of these organizations were put up for sale. During these periods, the TMSF became one of the largest media owners in the country.
Looking back at the 2000s, the assets held by the TMSF were sold to foreign investors, ushering in a period that extended until the introduction of the new Broadcasting Law in 2011. The foreign investors who entered Turkey at that time included companies based in the US and Europe such as CanWest, NewsCorp, Axel Springer, and Providence Equity Partners. If a new wave of foreign investment emerges, this time it is likely that companies based in the Gulf region will come to the fore. As the TMSF transfers its assets to new actors, it is certain that these actors will be groups that can be more easily controlled by the Erdoğan family. At this point, we are now talking about a group even narrower than what is referred to as the “pool media.”
Finally, when looking at the period between the 2001 crisis and the 2011 Broadcasting Law, it would not be surprising to see new legal regulations brought to the agenda. Although such regulations are usually presented with discursive justifications such as ownership, pluralism, and diversity, in practice they include provisions aimed at controlling not only ownership but also media content.
The regime, which has long sought to establish “cultural hegemony” but has failed to do so, may also bring a comprehensive legal regulation to the agenda. Indeed, up to now, many methods have been tried, such as the arrest of Ayşe Barım, RTÜK fines imposed on TV series, and the support of producers—mostly friends of Bilal Erdoğan—who produce series for TRT and Tabii. For this reason, a new broadcasting law that would consolidate all these content regulations under a single authority or umbrella is possible.
As Faruk Bildirici emphasized in his article written in May 2024, in recent years we have seen some new actors entering the media sector in Turkey through sudden, high-budget, and non-transparent investments. The swift closure of Ekol TV, founded by Azerbaijani businessman Masimov, was discussed as a current example of this situation. When we talk about media ownership in Turkey today, should we now focus not only on “who owns it” but also on the questions of “why, with what motivation, and for how long the investment is made”?
As I mentioned above, media ownership is important for Erdoğan both politically and ideologically. It is politically important because television remains an effective tool in determining the agenda—what topics will be discussed and which will not. Especially in the context of the upcoming general elections, if we consider that a consent-production effort is being aimed at around Bilal Erdoğan, this importance increases further. Although television—particularly news programs—is not watched as much as it used to be, we know that excerpts from discussion programs circulate rapidly on social media the same day or the next, thereby indirectly influencing the agenda or at least “making it onto the agenda.” That is why I believe television still has an indirect influence.
Another reason why media ownership is important for Erdoğan is ideological. In this context, goals such as the production of “domestic and national” content and the raising of a religious generation come to the fore. I am not saying that popular cultural content will be produced entirely according to a uniform prescription—although this is the case at TRT and Tabii. However, there has been a long-standing process of “bringing into line.” We saw how series scripts were altered at the last minute—as in the example of Kızılcık Şerbeti—in line with Turkish family structure and national and moral values.
Screenwriters and producers have now learned which topics should not be addressed or how they should be treated. Even “producing for digital”—which was once seen as a freer space—has increasingly become difficult in this regard. HBO Max’s removal of the series Jasmine from its platform is a concrete example of this. In summary, we are in a period where more right-wing nationalist and more conservative content is gaining dominance. What we are witnessing here is a marked ideological narrowing. Who knows, maybe next year there won’t even be special New Year’s Eve programs on TV.
Returning to the questions of “why, with what motivation, and for how long media investment is made”: we now know that people no longer enter the media sector for reasons such as journalism, entertainment, or public benefit. The media has not been a profitable sector for a long time. From now on, those who enter this field will do so to achieve the political and ideological goals I mentioned above—but of course, first upon assignment by Erdoğan.
The problem of access to transparent data
The increasing difficulty in accessing transparent data in a field as critically public as media ownership, especially following the implementation of the Personal Data Protection Law after 2018, indicates that access to information has become politicized. How do you think these restrictions on access to essential sources such as the Trade Registry Gazette and the Istanbul Chamber of Commerce affect the monitoring of media ownership and the informing of the public? How should we evaluate this picture in terms of democratic media debates? What kind of structural problems does this state of uncertainty create for a democratic media order?
In the Turkey country report we prepared together within the scope of the “Global Media and Internet Concentration Project,” we were able to obtain revenue data on telecommunications and internet companies. However, data was unavailable for many companies operating in sectors such as television, radio, newspapers, magazines, and books. The main reason for this is that most of the major newspapers and television channels in Turkey operate at a loss and base their revenues not on circulation and advertisements, but on state ads and subsidies provided by the holding companies they are affiliated with.
Unfortunately, in Turkey, companies operating in the media field do not engage in public and transparent data sharing. Similarly, global tech companies (Google, Microsoft, etc.) also do not disclose the revenues they generate from Turkey in the internet sector. This situation makes it difficult to analyze market concentration in the media and internet sectors in a healthy manner. More transparent and accessible data sharing is of great importance both for academic research and for correctly informing the public.
The problem of transparent data is not unique to Turkey; it is also seen in other countries in Asia, Africa, and South America. However, the situation in Turkey is particularly severe. As you said, an extreme level of commercial confidentiality is a significant factor and prevents public awareness. This is extremely negative for a democratic media order. We can hardly trust any data. Can we trust circulation figures? Are the ratings really accurate? Because everything has become politicized. Under these conditions, it is impossible to conduct analyses related to the media sector or to operate public oversight mechanisms. Unless transparency and accountability are ensured, the problems related to the democratic functioning of the media system will continue to deepen.
RTÜK fines
Data from the BİA Media Monitoring 2024 report shows that the Radio and Television Supreme Council (RTÜK) continues to impose heavy fines and broadcast suspension decisions, particularly targeting outlets critical of the government. What do such sanctions, in your view, indicate about the positioning of media owners in Turkey, their investment choices, and editorial lines?
As I mentioned above, the fines RTÜK imposes on news programs, entertainment content, and TV series have brought about self-censorship. Heavy financial penalties and broadcast suspensions amount to existential threats for the few outlets that are not pro-government. These organizations already have very limited advertising revenue; they receive no income from the Press Advertising Agency either. Therefore, financial sanctions and broadcast suspensions create a devastating impact for these media organizations.
The use of RTÜK as a “stick” in this way is, of course, not new; but we have seen the intensity increase in recent years. This situation directly affects the positioning of media owners: adopting a broadcasting line aligned with the government is not just an editorial choice—it also means economic survival.
Moreover, RTÜK has now transformed into a tool of supervision and pressure not only for television channels but also for digital platforms. Digital platforms have also begun to face sanctions such as content removal or the cancellation of series. These sanctions may not yet pose an existential threat to foreign platforms. However, in March 2025, the Competition Authority announced that it had launched investigations into Netflix, Disney+, Exxen, BluTV, Amazon, and Gain. As far as I know, the Competition Authority has not yet issued a decision. But state control may expand through institutions other than RTÜK as well.
The media of the future
We conducted a study within the scope of the “Our Media” project, which is supported by the EU and partnered by the IPS Communication Foundation / bianet. The findings will be published this month. Among the findings of this research is that monopolized ownership structures in the media threaten the journalism profession and that readers’ trust in the media has been shaken. In your view, what are the most important factors for ensuring a pluralistic media environment? Who has what responsibilities?
There was a debate last week; but since the agenda quickly shifted, it seems to have been forgotten. It was a journalism debate sparked by articles from Ahmet Hakan and Hande Fırat. Ahmet Hakan and Hande Fırat criticized the point we have reached, both through their personal roles and the institutions they work for. Setting aside the irony here, yes; trust in the media, especially in news media (television news, newspapers, digital newspapers, online news sites, etc.), is extremely low. But this problem cannot be solved by simply saying, “Journalists should not defend the AKP, journalists should only do journalism.” (Let’s also set aside the issue of why one would need to defend the AKP.)
“Trust” also implies a return to newspapers and television as sources of news. There is a hope that if a democratic and transparent ownership structure is built and news is produced only by those whose job is journalism, then readers and viewers will once again turn to these channels for news.
But we must also keep in mind that today’s readers and viewers are not the same as those in the past. There is now an audience that has become accustomed to receiving news from digital news sites, online newspapers, and social media for years. In fact, even what we call “news” is no longer what we used to know as “news.” Today, “receiving news” somewhat means accessing information or commentary about topics that Erdoğan does not want to be talked about. And this mostly means following former journalists who share or comment on news via YouTube or social media. Or reading and watching the small number of investigative journalists who still work at newspapers not aligned with the government.
So who has what responsibilities? Former journalists who produce programs on social media should focus on reporting rather than commentary. We should listen more to reporters than to commentators. Owners of non-pro-government newspapers or TV channels should support their investigative journalists and reporters—in every sense. Readers and viewers should avoid preferring commentary-based or talk-show-style content (in newspapers, TV, or on social media). They should not see or trust highly followed social media accounts that publish videos as news sources. Opposition parties should already begin thinking about how they will handle media ownership regulations in the event of a change in government. (SA/HA/VK)
