In the hours before U.S. and British forces first launched attacks on Taliban and al Qaeda targets, Vice President Dick Cheney telephoned Turkish President Ahmet Necdet Sezer to inform him of operation "Enduring Freedom." Sezer, in response and befitting the ties between close NATO partners, underscored Turkey's support and wished the United States success. The phone call reflects Turkey's importance to the United States as Ankara has become a pivotal ally in Washington's new battle against terrorism. While much of the Bush administration's diplomatic efforts have focused on the Arab Middle East, Turkey-a NATO ally, Muslim country, and aspirant to full-membership in the European Union-can offer the United States support in a range of areas where Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the Gulf states are either unable or reluctant to assist. Unlike Washington's Arab allies, Turkey has signaled clearly to the Bush administration its belief that a confluence of interests in fighting global terrorism exists between Washington and Ankara.
The Turkish government needed little persuading that Osama bin Laden and his al Qaeda network were responsible for the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. On October 3, Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit, in reference to Washington's presentation of evidence linking bin Laden to the attacks told the Turkish press, "The fact that the U.S. found it persuasive persuades us also." Moreover, once the United States and Great Britain began military operations in Afghanistan, Ankara apparently dropped whatever reservations it may have harbored concerning its own commitment of forces to the effort. Turkey's largest circulation daily, Hurriyet, reported that after a meeting in the early hours of October 8, Turkey's political and military leaders affirmed that they would support any NATO decision made within the framework of Article 5 of the North Atlantic treaty.
Sezer's words on the eve of war-as well as those of Ecevit, Foreign Minister Ismail Cem, Chief of Staff Hussein Kivrikoglu, and other Turkish leaders-should not, however, be interpreted as blanket Turkish support for the U.S. action in Southwest Asia and the Middle East. Since September 11, the Turkish leadership has fashioned a policy that can only be characterized as guarded-receptive to Washington in some areas, but clearly wary of others. To be sure, Ankara is and will remain a valuable ally of the United States, yet it is important to recognize that Turkey's fragile domestic political situation and complex regional interests dictate caution. Underneath the public bilateral assurances to each other, there will be significant sensitivities and pressure points in the U.S.-Turkish relationship as the situation in Afghanistan develops and Washington more fully elaborates its practical response to terrorism.
Common Interests and Practical Assistance
In general, the United States and Turkey share a core common concern with the guiding principles of the Taliban and al Qaeda. Though Turkey is 99.8 percent Muslim, Osama bin Laden, the Taliban, and their followers surely include the Turkish Republic among the "camp of disbelief." In the years after the founding of modern Turkey in 1921, Mustafa Kemal, known commonly as Atatürk, dismantled both the political and Islamic institutions of the Ottoman Empire and in its place established a political system that emphasized a secular cast to the new republic. Turkish secularism is not, however, the functional equivalent of the separation of church and state found in the United States. Instead, Turkey's political institutions-constitutions, laws, regulations, and statutes-along with organizations like the Ministry of Religious Affairs, have been designed to control religion and ensure that political expressions of Islam do not threaten the secular foundations of the state. Moreover, the Turkish military, which has long been the locus of power in the Turkish political system, considers itself a bulwark against what it often terms "reactionaryism." In the context of Turkey's political culture, where attempting to don a headscarf in an official building is regarded as a seditious act, the political program of the Taliban and al Qaeda are anathema.
The sharply different worldviews of the Turkish political leadership and their counterparts in Afghanistan represent a significant foreign policy challenge for Ankara. Since the early 1990s, Turkey has used its ethnic and linguistic proximity to Central Asia in an effort to become an influential actor among the former Soviet republics. One of Ankara's primary interests has been containing Islamic extremism. Though the large Russian minorities and state elites in Central Asia are implacably opposed to even moderate expressions of Islamism, there is some evidence to suggest that radicalism is a cause for concern. The Bush administration has already identified the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan as a terrorist organization, but there is also ongoing violence between Islamic groups and government forces in southern Tajikistan and Kyrgystan. Though Turkey's economic and political interests in Central Asia have not developed as Turkish leaders had once hoped and the area remains of limited strategic importance to Ankara, the prospect of the Taliban's lasting domination of Afghanistan and al Qaeda's continued presence there could pose significant problems for Turkey's regional allies.
Since September 11, Turkish officials, analysts, and columnists have pointedly reminded their audiences that Turkey has itself struggled with terrorist violence for the better part of the last two decades and is thus uniquely positioned to help shape the new global effort to eliminate this threat. Indeed, since the early 1980s, activists of the Marxist-oriented Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) have engaged in a violent confrontation with the Turkish state. Under Abdallah Ocalan, the PKK has sought to carve out an independent Kurdish homeland in the southeastern portion of Turkey. Ocalan's apprehension and subsequent trial in 1999 has largely undermined the capacity of the PKK to operate against Turkish forces. Though Ocalan's calls for a unilateral cease-fire and internal leadership squabbles have sowed instability and uncertainty within the organization, the PKK threat remains. In mid-August 2001, a senior PKK commander, Murat Karaliyan, warned the Turkish government that if efforts were not made to address Kurdish grievances, his organization "[would] try every means, including using arms" to affect a change in policy.1
While Kurdish separatist sentiment has been a very real challenge to the Turkish state, the Islamist-oriented extremist violence common to countries like Algeria and Egypt is largely alien to Turkey. Whereas a number of groups including Turkish Hizballah and Islami Buyuk Akincilar Cephesi (Great Raiders Front of Islam) espouse radical ideologies and threaten violence, they remain largely peripheral. Turkey's most influential Islamist movement, which, during the summer of 2001 split into two political groupings-the old guard oriented Saadet Partisi (Contentment Party) and the reformist Adelet ve Kalkinma Partisi (Justice and Development Party)-has, despite consistent state pressure, remained committed to its constitutionalist strategy. Still, the Turkish state remains wary of these groups and in its most recent statement outlining threats to Turkish security, the military establishment cited fundamentalist Islam as a primary problem.2 Perhaps of more concern than homegrown dangers is the possibility that extremist groups such as al Qaeda and the Taliban will target Turkey directly or Turkish interests around the globe.
Given these overriding common concerns, the Turks have indicated their willingness to assist the United States in five important areas:
* Troops and equipment -Initially, the Genelkumay (General Staff) expressed profound reluctance to commit troops to the U.S. effort. Chief of Staff Kivrikoglu even went so far as to describe, in what Hurriyet called friendly advice, any potential ground operation in Afghanistan as "madness." Still, once the prosecution of "Enduring Freedom" began, the Ecevit government secured authorization from the Turkish parliament for the mobilization of forces. On November 2, in response to Washington's request for assistance, elements of Turkey's elite special forces began preparing for deployment to Central Asia, where they will provide technical assistance to the Northern Alliance. If the need arises, Turkish troops may also play a prominent role in peacekeeping operations in a post-Taliban Afghanistan.
* Support for Pakistan -Turkey and Pakistan have a long history of close ties and General Pervaz Musharraf's coup d'etat in late 1999 did not affect them. Thus, Turkey has and will continue to play a role in offering Musharraf diplomatic and political support to stay the course against the Taliban and al Qaeda despite sentiment to the contrary on the Pakistani street.
* Intelligence -Turkey has either offered or agreed to provide intelligence assistance to the United States in two areas: 1) illicit finance, and 2) the Northern Alliance. The Turks, plagued with an inefficient and corrupt banking sector, have nevertheless pledged to share information with the U.S. on suspicious financial transactions and agreed to monitor Islamic financial institutions or "green capital." In fact, in late October, Turkish authorities froze bank accounts belonging to organizations ostensibly devoted to Bosnian and Chechen charities, but have been linked to al Qaeda. During Foreign Minister Cem's September visit to Washington, he relayed Ankara's offer to support the Northern Alliance and share its intelligence on these forces with Washington.
* Northern Iraq -Although the United States and Turkey differ over Iraq, the Turks can be helpful in targeting the al Qaeda affiliated Jund al-Islam (Soldiers of Islam) operating in northern Iraq. Turkish intelligence is yet to be convinced of the connection with bin Laden, but if a decision were made to target Jund al-Islam, Turkey's relations with two Kurdish groups in northern Iraq-the Kurdish Democratic Party and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan-would be indispensable to military operations.
* Military facilities -Incirlik airbase, which is located near Adana in the south-central portion of Turkey and is the only U.S. military facility in the country, has been critical to Washington's ability to conduct "Northern Watch" operations over Iraq. In the current undertaking against Afghanistan, Turkey has given U.S. forces overflight rights, meaning that Incirlik is being used to refuel U.S. military humanitarian aid flights on their return trips to Germany and as a hub for troops and equipment being transferred to Central Asia. The Turks have also provided airstrips in Malatya, Konya, and Izmir and port facilities at Antalya, Mersin, and Ceyhan for NATO.3 Previously, the United Region Air Operation Headquarters in Eskishehir, which is a NATO center, was considered as a possible alternative command center to Prince Sultan airbase in Saudi Arabia due to Riyadh's reluctance to allow the United States to command the campaign against the Taliban and al Qaeda from the kingdom.
Sensitivities and Pressures
Despite their common interests, Turkey and the United States must take great care to be sensitive to the pressures and constraints each confronts. For example, whereas 94 percent of the American public support the attacks on Afghanistan, roughly two-thirds of Turks oppose U.S. military operations against Afghanistan, the support Turkey has offered the United States, and Ankara's willingness to open Turkish military facilities to U.S. forces. Nearly 90 percent do not want to send Turkish troops to Afghanistan, and 58 percent are concerned that American attacks on Afghanistan could trigger a war between Christians and Muslims.4 This broad opposition to U.S. military action coupled with a deeply unpopular coalition government in Ankara poses potential problems for both countries as the efforts to combat terrorism continue.
Furthermore, Turkey's caution in some areas is related to Ankara's overriding concern about a backlash in the region that could spread to Turkish soil. This was evident in Turkey's sudden decision to move away from its longstanding efforts to forge ballistic missile defense cooperation with the United States and Israel just eight days after the attacks on New York and Washington. Turkey's official explanation stated that NATO was the proper framework for the development of missile defense. According to the Sabah newspaper, however, Ankara was concerned about unnecessarily antagonizing its neighbors through affiliations with the United States and Israel on such a contentious issue during a period of heightened tension in the Middle East.
Toward this end, the Turks have counseled caution on Afghanistan and withheld support for wider U.S. counter-terror operations in the Middle East. The poll numbers cited above give pause to the Turkish political and military elite who recognize that support for the United States could not be sustained in the event of a humanitarian disaster in Afghanistan. Moreover, in late September, Foreign Minister Cem told Secretary of State Colin Powell that increased suffering of the Afghan civilian population resulting from U.S. military action will "strengthen radical movements in the Islamic world." 5 For similar reasons, Turkey is not likely to welcome U.S. strikes against targets in Iran or Syria-two neighbors who are of general security concern to Ankara, despite growing commercial ties with Tehran and Damascus.
The Turks are, however, most concerned with Iraq. This problem actually pre-dates the events of September 11, but has been brought into sharp relief since then as Washington considers military operations against Baghdad. Simply, Turkey fears the break-up of Iraq and the establishment of a Kurdish state in the northern third of the country. Such an event would, from the Turkish perspective, encourage Kurdish separatist elements within Turkey to step up their efforts to carve out their own state in Turkey's southeast. Indeed, statements such as those of Under Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz suggesting that the United States would seek to "[end] states who [sic] support terrorism" caused considerable consternation in Ankara. Though this warning was directed at the Taliban, Turkish officials are worried Washington will use the September 11 attacks as justification to ratchet up its confrontation with Baghdad. During Foreign Minister Cem's visit to Washington, he implied that Turkey's support for U.S. military action could be withdrawn over the Iraq issue. The dispatch of Turkish special forces to Afghanistan may, in an indirect way, be part of Ankara's effort to influence the United States on the issue of Iraq. In reality, though, other than bringing those troops home and reconsidering the use of Turkish airspace and facilities for "Northern Watch," Ankara does not have decisive leverage to prevent U.S. attacks on Iraq.
More Vigorous U.S. Support?
Unlike the Arab states who have, at least publicly, made their support for the United States contingent upon a change in Washington's Middle East policy, the Turks have not made any demands on the Bush administration. Yet, even if there is no quid pro quo, political and military support are rarely free, even among allies and friends. Consequently, the Turks will likely expect more vigorous U.S. assistance in a number of areas including PKK terrorism, economic aid, military procurement, the European Security and Defense Initiative, the Cyprus situation, and European Union membership.
As mentioned above, the Turks have confronted the problem of political violence since the 1980s. Particularly galling from Ankara's perspective has been the attitude of its allies, particularly those in Europe, but also the United States, who have been content to allow Turkey to struggle with PKK terrorism while Kurdish activists were provided refuge in Washington and European capitals. In the wake of September 11, it is apparent Turkey will no longer allow this policy to continue. On October 1, the Turkish government renewed a request that the State Department and other U.S. government agencies review the status of Kani Xulam, a Kurdish activist in the United States who Ankara claims promotes the PKK's agenda in Washington. According to Turkish press accounts, the administration agreed to review the case, which in the words of the Turkish foreign minister, "strengthen[s] his hope that the war against terrorism will be successful in the end." 6
Since early 2001, a severe economic crisis has buffeted Turkey. With the support of the United States and Ankara's commitment to restructure the Turkish economy, Turkey has secured $10 billion in loans from the IMF. While implementation of a reform package has been generally smooth, the IMF has held up additional tranches of funding over concerns that the coalition government has sought to undermine some aspects of the program for domestic political considerations. In light of Turkey's support in the campaign against terrorism, Ankara-with significant help from Representative Kurt Weldon-is seeking both Washington's help with the IMF and direct U.S. financial assistance including the cancellation of military-related debts.7 This support is not, however, limited to Weldon or Congress. The Bush administration has repeatedly indicated that Washington looks favorably on additional IMF financing.
Though economic conditions have forced the Turkish military to postpone or suspend a number of modernization projects, the General Staff is moving ahead with a tender for 145 attack helicopters worth $4 billion. The military has selected the Bell AH 1Z King Cobra, though no contracts have been signed. This has nothing to do with Texas-based Bell Textron. Rather, the State Department has held up movement toward production due to a dispute over software for the chopper's mission computer. Turkey wants to produce the software code for the computers locally, but the United States has balked. In light of Turkey's support for the U.S. efforts to combat terrorism, it is quite likely that differences over the King Cobra will be resolved.
Turkey may also expect/request additional U.S. support regarding the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI), which would culminate in a 60,000 strong military force drawn from members of the European Union. The goal is to strengthen the EU's capabilities in crisis management, peacekeeping, and peace support under circumstances where NATO will not be involved. Turkey, which is not a member of the EU, wants a more substantive role in the ESDI process. Ankara believes that inasmuch as Turkey has contributed to European security as a member of the North Atlantic alliance since 1952 and EU-led operations may involve NATO assets, Turkey should be a full participant in ESDI decision-making. While Washington has called for "adequate [Turkish] participation in ESDI decision-shaping, especially for scenarios involving future EU actions in or around Turkey's neighborhood," Ankara is looking for a greater role and may anticipate the Bush administration's support.8
Turkey's position with regard to Cyprus, another EU-related issue, may receive more attention as a result of Ankara's support for the Bush administration's anti-terror initiatives. Like the rest of the world, the United States does not recognize the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus and during the latter part of the Clinton presidency there were significant differences between Washington and Ankara over the future status of the island.9 While the United States would prefer a resolution to the conflict on Cyprus before the island's ascension to the EU, Washington does not, like the Europeans, regard this issue as a condition of Cypriot membership. This places Turkey in the awkward position of occupying a fellow EU applicant. As part of Ankara's diplomatic efforts to block Cyprus' candidacy, the Turkish government has repeatedly raised questions about money laundering and official support for the PKK on the Greek side of the island. Though Turkey may very well find greater openness toward these concerns in the current environment, it is unlikely that the U.S. position on Cyprus will change.
Since the Ankara Agreement of 1964 made Turkey an associate member of the then European Economic Community, membership in the European club has been a defining objective of Turkish foreign policy. The attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon have, in an indirect manner, a bearing on Turkey's pending application for full membership. Whereas Osama bin Laden and his followers place Turkey squarely among the non-believers, the Europeans are not so convinced. Though the EU maintains that a range of economic and political issues need to be resolved before Turkish membership becomes reality, the cultural issue ( i.e., religion), though rarely discussed openly, remains important. It is unclear whether Europe is willing to accept a country of approximately 70 million Muslims as a partner in what is currently, among other things, a union of Christian states. In fact, in March 1997, the Christian Democratic parties represented in the European parliament stated that cultural issues would, in fact, ultimately keep Turkey out of the Union.10 Much has changed since that time and while successive European states have affirmed their intention to support Ankara's eventual membership, the cultural issue continues to lurk in the background.
It is precisely at the intersection of culture and EU politics where Osama bin Laden's attack on the United States in the name of Islam has placed Turkey's European aspirations at their greatest peril, but also quite possibly improved their potential for success. In a month where the Turkish parliament surprised most observers by quickly amending sections of Turkey's constitution to conform to European norms, the world was focused on the darkest interpretation and articulation of Islam. Quite clearly, renewed fears of Islamism and extremism may harm Turkey's bid for EU membership.
At the same time, however, when bin Laden and his associates called upon Muslims to battle non-believers, Turkey rejected extremism. By placing itself firmly, though somewhat hesitantly in some areas, on the side of the United States, Ankara made clear that the coming clash was not about civilizations or religion. This should demonstrate to Turkey's potential partners in Europe that although significant challenges remain relating to Turkish membership, culture should not be one of them. In time, Ankara may look to Washington to help emphasize this point.
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NOTES
1. Medya-TV, August 18, 2001; reported in "PKK Threatens Turkey with Renewed Warfare," http: www.albawaba.com.
2. "Military Prepares a New National Security Policy Document Retaining Fundamentalism and Separatism as Number One Internal Threats," Selected News on Turkey, August 6-12, 2001.
3. Milliyet, "Incirlik is 'Advance Police Post,'" October 9, 2001, (Translated in Excerpts from the Turkish Dailies).
4. "Majority Opposes Attack on Afghans," Turkish Daily News, October 4, 2001; Despite general opposition to U.S. policy and American-Turkish cooperation, demonstrations protesting operation "Enduring Freedom" in cities such as Istanbul, Konya, and Adana have been relatively small.
5. Hurriyet, "Five Messages to the U.S.," October 26, 2001
6. Turkish News "Cem Asks U.S. to End Support for PKK Activists," October 1, 2001.
7. Turkish News, "U.S. Delegation Suggests Rethink of Turkey's $5 Billion Military Debt," October 2, 2001; Milliyet, "U.S. Will Intercede with IMF," October 11, 2001; Sabah "Ecevit: A Great Deal of External Aid is Needed," October 15, 2001.
8. U.S. Ambassador W. Robert Pearson, address to the American-Turkish Council Annual Conference, Washington, DC (March 26, 2001).
9.George S. Harris, "U.S.-Turkish Relations," in Alan Makovsky and Sabri Sayari (eds.) Turkey's New World: Changing Dynamics in Turkish Foreign Policy (Washington: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2000): 193.
10. "Turkey Good Enough for NATO, But Not for the EU?" Foreign Media Reaction Daily Digest, March 14, 1997; http://www/fas.org/man/nato/national/97031401rmr.htm
