The general assumption was that the elections would result in a coalition government but, with the election results now known, it looks like a landslide victory for Erdogan and his 'Justice and Development Party' (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP). With 34.3 percent of the vote, the party will have 363 of the 550 deputies and therefore almost has the majority needed to push through constitutional amendments.
Although the social democratic Republican People's Party (CHP) more than doubled its share of the vote to 19.3 percent and will have 178 deputies, it can still be said to be the loser. The governing parties, led by Bulent Ecevit (DSP), Mesut Yilmaz (ANAP) and Devlet Bahçeli (MHP), all recorded less than 10 percent of the vote and will no longer be represented in the National Assembly.
Not only have they lost the elections, they will be banished to the political wilderness. Even Tansu Çiller (DYP) failed to clear the 10 percent hurdle, although she could have profited being in opposition like Erdogan. The Democratic People's Party (DEHAP), the Kurdish party, once again foundered on its political inability to mobilise Kurdish voters in the cities.
DEHAP dominated in the Kurdish provinces, while the Social Democrats recorded a majority on the west coast. In every other province, the AKP became the strongest party. These elections, described as historic, throw up a number of fundamental questions.
What does the AKP's election victory mean? Will Turkey become an Islamic republic? What was behind the election victory? Will this majority stabilise in the long term? Why did the traditional parties fail? Why was DEHAP unable to mobilise Kurdish voters? Did the EU play a part in the elections? Will the new government stand by accession to the EU? Or will the country lurch into a crisis of political identity?
Before we examine these questions, let us take a look at the election results over the last ten years and the composition of the Turkish National Assembly:
Election results in percent
Parties 1991 1995 1999 Members 2002 Members
Islamist-AKP 16.9 21.38 15.64 111 34.1 363
Nationalist-MHP -- 8.18 19.45 129 8.3 ---
Social Dem.-CHP 20.8 10.71 8.79 --- 19.3 178
Dem. Left-DSP 10.8 14.64 22.06 136 1.3 ---
Centre-DYP 27.00 19.18 12.00 85 9.4 ---
Centre-ANAP 24.00 19.65 13.22 86 5.2 ---
DEHAP -- 4.17 4.73 ---- 6.1 ---
The background to the AKP's election victory
If we investigate the reasons for the AKP's election victory, it can be explained, first and foremost, by the failure of the governing parties and also of the opposition party, the CHP. After breaking away from the Islamic movement, the AKP tried to establish itself on the basis of two political approaches.
The most important political question, the extent to which they are 'Islamic', has been largely sidestepped. They justified their split from the traditionalists by saying that the latter had made 'mistakes'. They had polarised the country on the question of religion and provoked unnecessary tensions.
The country now needed unity and dialogue and could not afford tensions. This is why they have not only avoided but have consciously refrained from political debates concerning symbols such as the wearing of headscarves in public. Instead, they have brought the issue of religious freedom to the fore and, indeed, not as a major issue but, among other things, alongside freedom of opinion and human rights.
They have propagated a European model of the relationship between state and religion and, in so doing, justified their pro-EU stance. The political persecution of their chairman, who is unable to occupy any political office because of a remark he made, and the efforts of the judiciary in the election campaign failed to destroy this concept but actually won the party votes.
The second and decisive reason for the success lies, however, in the party's fundamental criticism of the country's economic and social situation. The extremely severe economic crisis, which Turkey is currently experiencing, is not just the consequence of the policy of the governing parties.
The last decades of Turkish politics and the economic bankruptcy of the country are a shared bequest of the centre parties. The corruption and political impotence of these parties have not only brought the country to ruin but have also increased social imbalances.
The AKP focussed on corruption, social injustice and the country's indebtedness and dependence in its election campaign. The judiciary attacked the more the party's leadership and the governing parties, the more credible they were able to appear. The two opposition parties, the CHP and DYP, left these areas wholly to the AKP and practised being governing parties in opposition, which is why their voters migrated to the AKP too.
The electorate comprises two of the social groups hardest hit by the economic crisis. In the past, the Islamists' election victories always came in the provinces of the central plateau region where, until the 1990s, they captured 10 percent of the overall vote. Today the central plateau provinces such as Konya with 54.94 percent of the vote, Kayseri with 54.34 percent and Yozgat with 51.15 percent continue to dominate.
In the 1990s their criticism of the Social Democrat ruling coalition brought them new support from voters in the slums of the big towns such as Istanbul (37 percent), Ankara 1 (32.94 percent), Ankara II (43.17 percent), Bursa (41.31 percent) and Izmir (29 percent), giving them 22 percent of the overall vote back in 1995.
They now have extended their voter base from both these sources at the same time as winning votes from the ANAP, DYP and MHP. As a result, the party has modelled itself as a classic conservative people's party with a social focus.
Everything points to the party seeking to pursue the policies of a Christian-democratic party with a social orientation. Not only the election campaign but also the internal debate within the party suggests that they will not want to disturb the secular structure of the Turkish state. The question of 'religious freedom' and how it is defined could become the focal point for internal tensions. The army and influential groups will react much more sensitively to this question than they have done in the past.
The question of EU integration will be another of the political touchstones by which the party is judged. Although the party stems from a movement, which, until the 1990s, was against EU membership, it is now in favour of accession to the EU.
Moreover, it did not intervene in the debate when there were calls from within the EU to exclude Turkey from Europe on cultural and religious grounds. Turkey's relations with the EU will therefore be an important measuring stick in the future. This situation confers on the EU an important role, which it did not have in these elections.
The governing parties foundered on their impotence
The performance of the ruling DSP under Prime Minister Ecevit more than clarifies the mood in Turkey. Ecevit didn't even win the votes of those who owe him something. His 1.3 percent of the vote is worse than marginal and requires no further comment. Half of the party's supporters returned to the CHP; the remainder either did not turn out or voted AKP.
The voters did not attach any political significance to the split from the DSP under the leadership of longstanding Foreign Minister Ismail Cem. With just 1.2 percent of the vote, the party will soon be dissolved. The liberal-centre Motherland Party, ANAP, under the leadership of Yilmaz, was also punished for the policies of recent years and for corruption.
Yilmaz failed to turn the elections into a referendum on the EU. His attempt to appear as a guarantee of EU integration failed because the EU did not become a decisive issue in the election campaign. The Nationalists likewise failed in their attempt to link the Kurdish question to the EU.
The voters, who flocked to the Nationalists in 1999 after the arrest of Öcalan, leader of the PKK, had different worries this time. The Nationalists targeted the 30 percent of voters who are 'anti-EU' and lost. The MHP, however, is the only one of the three governing parties, which can fall back on a well-organised party. Should the EU debate return to the heart of political discussion, the MHP can and will project itself as being against the EU. The ANAP and DSP will be banished from the political landscape forever.
The Social Democrats foundered on their 'opposition policy'
Although 178 deputies represent the Republican People's Party, the CHP, which attracted centre-left voters until the 1990s, in the National Assembly, it will be unable to achieve much against the superior numbers of the AKP.
The CHP, led by Deniz Baykal, is therefore the real loser of the election, having been able to mobilise only half of the DSP's voters and failing to become an alternative to the AKP. There were two fundamental reasons for its defeat. The Social Democrats failed to place the consequences of the economic crisis and social impoverishment at the heart of their election campaign.
This time, in contrast to previous election campaigns, Baykal tried to avoid criticising the government and the Prime Minister, even when the consequences of the economic crisis were causing widespread social unrest. Equally, he failed to place the question of democratic reforms and the EU at the heart of his election campaign. By trying to be the better governing party, he failed in the eyes of the voters.
This is why the theory that Dervis, the Finance Minister, cost the party more votes than he won them must be taken very seriously. Assuming that approximately 5percent of liberal voters (e.g. supporters of the ANAP) in the big towns voted for the party on account of Dervis, then the mobilisation of left-wing voters shrinks to less than 15 percent. In the crucial weeks of the election campaign Baykal concentrated all his efforts on Dervis.
In so doing, he defended government policy of recent years without making an issue of the social consequences of this policy. The policy implemented by the IMF stopped Turkey going bankrupt, but the population paid the price.
Kurdish voters in the big towns did not vote for the DEHAP
Once again, a 'Kurdish' party failed to clear the 10percent hurdle although the party leadership were convinced they would do so. This party's election campaign was very well organised. Its meetings were well attended. Medya-TV also provided the party with a medium used by the Kurdish population. Attacks by the judiciary must be ruled out as an explanation because precisely this could have won votes for this party at the ballot box as it did for the AKP.
The DEHAP became the strongest party with over 40 percent of the votes in some of the Kurdish provinces. It captured 56.16 percent of the vote in Diyarbakir, 44.9 percent in Hakkari, 40.6 percent in Van and 47.16 percent in Batman but failed to mobilise Kurdish voters in the big towns. Even in the 'Kurdish' district of Istanbul, home to three million Kurdish immigrants, the share of the vote was only 6 percent. The DEHAP failed to address the social and political problems of these Kurds. It was unable to disassociate itself from the armed struggle of the PKK. Only by winning the votes of the majority of Kurds will the party be able to clear the 10 percent hurdle.
The EU could be the decisive political question
The AKP's election victory brings two questions to the fore. Will Islam become a political orientation for the new government? Is the country heading towards a crucial test? These two questions are also the topics of political debate in Turkey because the forerunner party's first spell in government ended in a 'modern putsch' by the Turkish army.
The state visit to Gaddafi revealed the first signs of a rift between the higher echelons of the army and the government. However, there is every reason to suppose that the AKP leadership will not be repeating the mistakes of its forerunners, not just because the Turkish judiciary and the army would not shrink from banning such a party, even in the face of an overwhelming parliamentary majority, but also because the new government has very little scope for political manoeuvre.
Turkey is currently experiencing a severe economic crisis and is wholly dependent on credits extended by the IMF and the USA. The Turkish government's room for manoeuvre in terms of changing current policy is not very large but even without the prevailing economic crisis; Turkey can hardly achieve the necessary economic growth without direct investment from the West.
Even less can she afford a decline in trade relations with the EU and the USA. Turkey has no natural wealth such as oil or other economic alternatives like Iran or Iraq. This is why the government will do everything it can to develop economic and political relations with the EU. But will it also push for accession to the EU, as repeatedly claimed in the election campaign?
This issue, alongside Turkey's policy with respect to Israel, will become a touchstone of political orientation. The AKP will not have any problems in implementing democratic reforms because Erdogan himself is a victim of Article 312 of the Penal Code. Constitutional reform will also be possible in order to complete the democratic process, because the CHP will hardly be able to vote against democratic reforms and against democratisation of the constitution.
Where the Kurdish question is concerned, the party will seek a dialogue because, after the DEHAP, it is the second-strongest party in the Kurdish provinces, providing almost all the deputies due to the fact that the DEHAP failed to clear the election hurdle.
Relations with the EU will therefore be seen as a means of testing the government's policy vis-à-vis the EU by all forces which reject an Islamic orientation and see the country's economic development as being within Europe. If they decide in favour of accession and are able to point to successes in this area, they will reinforce their image as a modern conservative party with a social orientation. If they adopt a passive policy vis-à-vis the EU, they will be accused of pushing for an Islamic policy. In this respect the EU will become increasingly important to developments in Turkey over the coming months. (AY/NM)
