The reference to the term Kurdistan represents exactly that what is going on today concerns all four parts, with specific focus on the Kurds in Syria and Iraq. Beyond any doubt, the role of the Kurds in Turkey and specifically of the PKK Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan, Kurdistan Workers’ Party) movement has been also important in the support of the Kurdish confrontation of Islamic State, formerly known as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (داعش, IS, July 2013).
Beyond any second or third reading, what is actually happening today is an ongoing humanitarian crisis considering the influx of Syrian refugees in Turkey, the Kurdistan Region and elsewhere, not only of Kurdish but also non Kurdish population, and as such could not leave the international community unmoved.
On a second level, the fear spread by the brutal image that IS communicated to the public created the concern that IS is not solely a local threat but also a regional and probably a potential international threat, considering its birth in Syria and thereafter its spread in Iraq. Above all, though, the alarm that this group could expand even beyond the borders of the Middle East and threaten the states of this international community explains the alertness this issue has caused.
In this context, international support is essential and therefore the issue has drawn the attention of the majority of the European states, a fact the dimension of which has caused anxiety in many Arab states and in particular the Arab Gulf region, which sees the empowerment of the Kurdish movement at a moment when Article 140 has not yet been implemented and when a referendum about both the fate of the disputed areas, and in particular Kirkuk, as well as Kurdish independence are still pending.
In this regard should be viewed first the immediate response of the Iranian state of sending troops to fight IS in Iraq and the subsequent US involvement, and secondly the awkward position of the Turkish government since the disturbance of its relations with the Syrian regime and its policy of dictation to Bashar Al Assad to implement specific reforms since August 2011.
Thus once more the KR appears the apple of discord between Tehran and Ankara as a broader sphere of influence and control considering its oil reserves, the aspirations for autonomy in the way towards the possibility of a Confederate Kurdish State, and the competition for regional dominance.
The confrontation of any sort of extremism for the sake of regional peace and coexistence appears as another incentive in support of the Kurds, especially when thousands of civilians are being killed massively and on a daily basis.
In a brief assessment it seems today that international support is indeed a necessity if the battle against IS is to be successful, as there is a great need for advanced weaponry and other warfare tools. Iran appears a temporary winner since the current situation helped turn the eyes of the international community anywhere else but on Tehran’s problems, and further aided their resolution as it appears to be the case today with Iran’s nuclear file. Turkey is in the most difficult period and it seems that, however, the Turkish foreign policy shrugs off the sectarian tool as means of its foreign policy implementation; unluckily it is a challenge not to be dragged into the emerging Sunni- Shi’a divide. Ankara’s inability to act promptly when the phenomenon of IS arose did not benefit its Kurdish policies at all as it would probably have been expected and even more it did not prevent the cost affect which Turkey was afraid of from the very beginning. The Kurdish part in both Syria and Iraq is a very attractive pole of control for the Turkish foreign policy. Yet the Dohuk Agreement (October 2014) is a very critical step forward as unity among the Kurdish movements but also within is imperative considering that the Kurds have but one ally, their ethnic compatriots.
In this attempt, the role of the PKK should not be underestimated as a key non state actor in both the unification of the Kurdish movement as well as balancing internal Turkish politics in the same vein as the KRG, as the first Kurdish de facto state entity already established and regionally but also internationally recognized, could in turn contribute to the recognition of the Kurdish Autonomous Cantons in Syria (11 November 2013). The current international aid and support offered to the Kurds because of their struggle against IS is an unfortunate opportunity that they should though take advantage of positively from now on.
At the same time, the benefits for the international community through supporting the Kurds lies also in their ability to end the 30 years of bloodshed between Ankara and the PKK and thus result in the much desired resolution of Turkey’s Kurdish issue as well as the fact that the Kurds are a useful ally in the fight against terrorism. Finally, there is always the danger that leaving the Kurdistan Region to either Iranian or Turkish control would appear as an unsatisfactory development for the international community but more importantly in the eyes of the US.
One thing is certain; the coming years are going to be most difficult, especially for the people of the Middle Eastern region themselves.
* This article is based on a talk given at SOAS University, (15.11.2014).
* Dr. Marianna Charountaki is a Sessional Lecturer at Reading University (UK). Her research interests range from international relations and foreign policy analysis to the international relations of the broader Middle East. She is the author of the book The Kurds and US Foreign Policy: International Relations in the Middle East since 1945, (Routledge, 2010) as well as articles like “US foreign policy in theory and practice: from Soviet-era containment to the era of the Arab Uprisings(s), Journal of American Foreign Policy Interests: the Journal of the National Committee on American Foreign Policy, Vol.36, Issue 4, (Routledge, 2014), pp.255-267.)
